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LEGISLATION-SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL AND TORT
AsPECTS OF SHOPLIFTING STATUTEs-Shoplifting1 not only results
in heavy financial losses for the merchant2 but also poses special
problems in criminal law and general law enforcement.3 One such
problem arises from the fact that most such thefts involve relatively small amounts, with the result that the public does not seem
extremely concerned about the matter when an individual case
comes up for prosecution. Another peculiar difficulty is that perhaps more than any other single crime shoplifting is an offense
committed by amateurs, both adult and juvenile.4 This serves to
make both detection and prosecution difficult. Finally, the right
of the individual to be free from unlawful or unreasonable interference with his person or property> is more directly involved in
this area of criminal law enforcement than in most others.
Merchants have done much on their own in order to decrease
shoplifting losses. Retail associations have disseminated information with regard to the best methods to be used in preventing and
discouraging pilferage.° Closed circuit television has been effective as a means of identifying and apprehending shoplifters.7 Private detectives vested with police authority may be a potent weapon
in the protection of their employers' property.8 And with the
passage of new shoplifting legislation the merchants have initiated
1 Shoplifting, broadly defined, is larceny or theft of goods or merchandise displayed
for sale in a store. Employee pilferage and shopper victimization will not be discussed in
this comment.
2 See the statutory preamble to the new Florida shoplifting legislation, 22 Fla. Stat.
Ann. (1944; Supp. 1958) §811.022, which estimates an annual $4,500,000 loss in Florida
alone; and N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1954, p. 30:1, which estimates a weekly loss of $100,000
in thefts from New York City stores. These losses generally are borne by the honest
customer.
s F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, Vol. XXV, No. 2, p. 108, Table 37 (1954) reports
an increase in known shoplifting offenses of 11.4% from 1953 to 1954. Vol. XXVI, No. 2,
p. 109, Table 37 (1955) reports a 4.4% increase from 1954 to 1955.
4 See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1957, p. 24:2, reporting that police blamed a high
school student shoplifting fad for a large part of a loss totalling $100,000 in a Sharon,
Pennsylvania shopping center. The new Ohio shoplifting legislation [Ohio Rev. Code
(Baldwin, 1958) §2935.041] provides merchants with special privileges for dealing with
juvenile offenders. See comment, 62 YALE L.J. 788 at 790 (1953); note, 32 IND. L.J. 20 at
28-33 (1956).
5 See, generally, Seavy, "Principles of Torts," 56 HARV. L. REv. 72 (1942); ToRTS RESTATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. I, §120A, comment a (1957). The Michigan
Legislative Committee on Shoplifting has concluded that all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the privacy and rights of citizens: 69th Mich. Leg. (Reg. Sess. 1958) No. 23,
p. 249 at 250.
6 E.g., National Retail Merchants Association, Store Management Group pamphlet
entitled "Watch Out for That Thief," on file in the Michigan Law Review office.
7N.Y. TIMES, OCT. 7, 1956, §3, p. 1:4. Large convex mirrors appropriately placed
throughout stores may be just as effective; N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1957, p. 23:6.
a See note, 32 IND. L.J. 20 at 26 (1956).
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publicity campaigns aimed at forewarning and thereby frightening
off the would-be thief. But the expense of such "self-help" programs makes them available only to large merchants. And, perhaps
more important, these measures do little to remove or lessen that
which probably more than any other factor deters a merchant from
taking action against pilferage: the fear that he will be liable in
damages if he apprehends a suspected shoplifter who is later proved
innocent.

I.

DOCTRINES APPLIED APART FROM THE NEW SHOPLIFTING
LEGISLATION9

At common law, a property owner could use reasonable force
to defend10 or recapture11 his property only if he was correct in
believing that an interference with his property was threatened by
the party against whom he acted. If an innocent person was accosted, detained, questioned or searched, the merchant was generally civilly liable for his wrongful conduct. This liability might
be imposed in actions of false imprisonment,12 false arrest,1 3 assault
and battery,14 malicious prosecution,1 5 slander16 or even insult
and outrage.17
The merchant's position at common law was made still more
difficult by the fact that in most jurisdictions an arrest by a private
individual without a warrant,18 for an alleged misdemeanor, even
if committed in his presence, was illegal unless the misdemeanor
constituted a breach of the public peace.19 An illegal arrest sub9 See, generally, Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 541, 673 and
798 (1924); comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 887 (1952), cont. in 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 82 (1952);
comment, 62 YALE L.J. 788 (1953).
10 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 92 (1955); 1 TORTS REsrATEMENT §77 (1934).
11 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 100 (1955); 1 TORTS RESTATEMENT §§100-106 (1934).
_ 12 E.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W. (2d) 759 (1940).
13 E.g., Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W. (2d)
638 (1944). See 21 A.L.R. (2d) 643 (1952).
14 E.g., Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 S. (2d) 510 (1941).
15 E.g., Grove v. Purity Stores, 153 Cal. App. (2d) 23_4, 314 P. (2d) 543 (1957).
16 E.g., Camp v. Maddox, 93 Ga. App. 646, 92 S.E. (2d) 581 (1956).
17 No merchant has been held liable for insulting language alone, but where such
language is combined with other wrongful acts recovery has been allowed on a theory of
tortious misconduct toward an invitee. Mansour v. Mobley, 96 Ga. App. 812, 101 S.E.
(2d) 786 (1957). With regard to the tort of insulting or abusive language, see, generally,
Prosser, "Insult and Outrage," 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1956); 15 A.L.R. (2d) 108 (1951).
18 Arrest without a warrant may be defined as an " .•• apprehension without any
special authorization but merely under a general authority which the officer or private
person has (or thinks he has) under the circumstances." Perkins, "The Law of Arrest,"
25 IowA L. REv. 201 at 229 (1940). For a definition of arrest, see Wilgus, "Arrest Without
a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 541 at 543 (1924).
19 However, a private person may arrest for a felony committed within his presence,
or a felony committed outside his presence if it was in fact committed and he has reason-
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jected the arresting party to civil liability regardless of the guilt of
the party accused. Although many jurisdictions have by statute
broadened the arrest powers of both peace officers20 and private
persons,21 few states have enabled a merchant to arrest suspected
shoplifters without the fear of liability for a mistake either in
identity or the fact of commission.22 In addition, the effectiveness
of legislation broadening the arrest power of private individuals
has often been limited by judicial interpretation, since the statutes
are in derogation of common law rules.23 Legislation broadening
the power of police officers to arrest without a warrant in cases of
misdemeanors, enacted in most states,24 is basically ineffective in
able grounds for believing the person arrested committed it. The common law rules are
discussed in Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 673 (1924). The
classification of a theft from a store as a felony or misdemeanor depends on the value of
the merchandise taken. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. (1953) §76-38-5, providing that if the
value of the property is less than $50, theft is a misdemeanor. With this approach the
usual shoplifting theft is a misdemeanor. But see 3 Alaska Comp. Laws (1949) §65-5-42
and 3 Alaska Comp. Laws (Cum. Supp. 1958) §65-2-2, and Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)
§750.360, classifying shoplifting as a felony. Several states make all larcenies felonies. E.g.,
7 Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §39-4204.
20 Peace officer is defined in Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv.
541 at 561-562 (1924). See also Doherty v. Lester, 4 Misc. (2d) 741, 159 N.Y .S. (2d) 219
(1957), finding that a private detective is not a peace officer; Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50
Wash. (2d) 649, 314 P. (2d) 414 (1957), finding that a deputized store detective had officer's
arrest powers.
21 See Appendix II for a state-by-state classification of the arrest powers of both peace
officers and private citizens, before and after recent shoplifting legislation.
22 But see Wyo. Stat. (1957) §7-156 and Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue 1956) §29-402,
which allow private persons to arrest without warrants where "petit larceny has been
committed" and the arresting person has "reasonable grounds to believe the person arrested
is guilty." Texas expressly allows a merchant to arrest without a warrant in order to
prevent the consequences of a theft. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (Vernon, 1954) §§212,
325. Section 325 has been held to give store employees the power to arrest a suspected
pickpocket; Lasker v. State, 163 Tex. Cr. 337, 290 S.W. (2d) 901 (1956).
23 E.g., the statutory "presence" requirement is often restrictively interpreted. See
Alsup v. Skaggs Drug Center, 203 Okla. 525, 223 P. (2d) 530 (1949). See State v. Pluth,
157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923), and Smith v. Hubbard, (Minn. 1958) 91 N.W. (2d)
756 for what is necessary to meet such a "presence" requirement.
24 Most states by statute allow an officer to arrest without a warrant where the offense
is committed in his presence. See Appendix II for a state-by-state classification. Several
states go farther and permit such arrests where the officer has reasonable grounds to
believe the person committed a misdemeanor and the misdemeanor has in fact been
committed. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1957) §39-2-20. Iowa and Illinois
have similar statutes. III. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 38, §657; Iowa Code (1958) §755.4. Officers
in Michigan possess the same power because shoplifting is classified as a felony. Mich.
Comp. Laws (1948) §764.15. In Wisconsin the officer may arrest without a warrant if he
has reasonable grounds to believe a misdemeanor has been committed and the arrest is
necessary to prevent the consequences. Wis. Stat. (1958) §954.03. Hawaii allows an officer
to arrest and detain on a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or intends
to commit an offense. Hawaii Rev. Laws (1955) §§255.3-255.4. R.I. Gen. Laws (1956)
§12-7-3 (c) is similar. In Texas, officers, like private persons, may arrest to prevent the
consequences of a theft. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (Vernon, 1954) §§212, 325. In Williams v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. 439, 236 S.W. (2d) 136 (1951), an officer was allowed to arrest
a suspected misdemeanant under §325.
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dealing with suspected shoplifters primarily because the officer is
rarely present when the pilfering is committed or attempted.
Moreover, like statutes broadening the arrest power of private
citizens, legislation doing the same for peace officers has been restrictively interpreted.25
A number of states, apart from recent shoplifting statutes, have
tried to give storekeepers some protection by recognizing "probable cause or reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of a
theft" as a mitigating circumstance to be used to reduce exemplary
and punitive damages in civil actions brought by persons unlawfully detained or arrested. 26 Some jurisdictions have gone farther
and judicially recognized "probable cause" as a complete defense
in cases which would otherwise have been unlawful detention of
a suspected shoplifter by a merchant.27 However, this defense generally has been extended only to short detentions for the purpose
of investigation and has not been available in actions for false
arrest. 28

II.

RECENT SHOPLIFTING LEGISLATION

Statutory broadening of arrest powers and judicial development of defenses for the merchant were not sufficient to cope fully
with the unique problems of shoplifting. Legislation of various
types, all dealing specifically with the shoplifting problem, has been
enacted by thirty-seven states.29 Twenty-three states have new
criminal legislation. Twelve states have enlarged the power of
peace officers to arrest without a warrant where suspected shop25 See note 23 supra. The officer's arrest power may be further limited if he delays
in making the arrest. See 58 A.L.R. (2d) 1056 (1958). And he can use only a limited
amount of force in arresting a suspected misdemeanant. See 3 A.L.R. II70 (1919) and
42 A.L.R. 1200 (1926); Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 798 at
814-815 (1924).
26 See 137 A.L.R. 504 (1942) and 49 A.L.R. (2d) 1460 (1956). For an extended discussion of the judicial doctrine of probable cause in cases of unlawful detention, see
comment, 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 82 (1952).
27 Collyer v. S. H. Kress &: Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936); Montgomery
Ward v. Freeman, (4th Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 720. TORTS REsTATEMENT SECOND, Tentative
Draft No. I, §120A (1957). In Teel v. May Dept. Stores, 348 Mo. 696, 155 S.W. (2d) 74
.(1941), an instruction on probable cause was allowed in an action for false imprisonment,
but this may be due to the fact the actions of the plaintiff included false personation,
a felony. See also Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943)
(merchant's detention clearly unreasonable); S. H. Kress &: Co. v. Bradshaw, 186 Okla. 588,
99 P. (2d) 508 (1940) (plaintiff unaware of any detention during the investigative period) .
.But see Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W. (2d) 759 (1940).
28 E.g., Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50 S.E. (2d) 387 (1948);
Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W. (2d) 638 (1944).
See TORTS REsTATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. 1, §120A, comment d (1957).
29 All statutory citations may be found in Appendix I. Throughout the text the
statutes will be referred to only by state of enactment.
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lifters are involved, and one of these has broadened the arrest
power of its private citizens. Twenty-eight states have created
statutory privileges for the merchant who seeks to apprehend suspected shoplifters.
In discussing the new statutes, their possible interpretation,
practical application and effectiveness will be considered. In the
discussion which follows, it will be assumed that the typical shoplifting situation involves an actual or suspected misdemeanor. References to either officers' or citizens' arrest powers will be to arrests
without warrants for misdemeanors.

A. Criminal Provisions
Prior to the adoption of the new statutes shoplifting was generally prosecuted under larceny statutes.30 Because the elements
needed to prove larceny do not coincide with the evidence often
available in shoplifting cases, convictions were difficult to obtain.31
For example, unless a witness saw the taking and subsequent departure from the premises without payment for the goods, it was
hard to prove the essential element of an intent to deprive the
owner of his property or to appropriate the property to the taker's
own use. In an attempt to facilitate criminal prosecutions, some
of the new statutes provide that certain specific acts shall constitute
the crime of shoplifting. Statutory presumptions which shift to
the defendant the burden of producing evidence have been created.
Finally, stronger penalties which increase in severity with the commission of subsequent offenses have been imposed.
Georgia and West Virginia have defined four distinct acts, any
one of which constitutes the crime of shoplifting:
". . . wilfully to take possession of any merchandise offered
for sale by any store with the intention of converting the same
to the use of such person without paying to the owner the
value thereof."
". . . wilfully to conceal upon his person or otherwise any
merchandise offered for sale by any store with the intention
of converting the same to the use of such person without paying to the owner the value thereof."
" ... wilfully to alter any label, price tag or marking upon any
merchandise offered for sale by any store with the intention of
depriving the mvner of all or some part of the value thereof."
so E.g., N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §§1290 (defining larceny) and 1298
(defining petit larceny).
31 See, generally, note, 32 IND. L.J. 20 (1956).
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" ... wilfully to transfer any merchandise offered for sale by
any store from the container in or on which the same shall be
displayed to any other container with intent to deprive the
owner of all or some part of the value thereof."32
Several other states have framed criminal legislation in terms of
more than one distinct act, 33 but the majority have adopted a
single standard of criminal conduct, enacting either the "take
possession without payment" or "willful concealment" type statutes. 34
·
On their face, the "take possession without payment" statutes
seem to encounter the same difficult proof problems encountered
under the broader larceny statutes. These statutes all continue to
require proof of an intent to convert. To prove such intent, the
merchant might have to allow the thief to leave the premises, or
at least go beyond the check-out counter, thereby affording the
suspect a means of escape. Moreover, it will not be difficult for
the suspect, often an amateur with no past criminal record, to convince the jury that he simply forgot to pay for the goods. Since
the prosecution must prove the elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, the "forgot to pay" defense will probably be
quite successful. For this reason nine states have enacted statutory
presumptions to the effect that a willful concealment of goods is
sufficient to create a presumption of the necessary intent to convert.35 Similarly, some of these also provide that the finding of
goods concealed upon a person or among his belongings, or upon
the person or among the belongings of another, is prima facie
evidence of willful concealment.36 These statutory presumptions
are not likely to create constitutional problems37 and should aid
32 W. Va. Code (Supp. 1959) §5990 (8).
33 Texas defines shoplifting as the removal

of goods from their place with an intent
to take and deprive the owner of value, or the altering of labels or shifting of containers
with intent to defraud. Oregon and Rhode Island define shoplifting in terms of both
willful concealment and taking possession without payment, requiring an intent to convert
under either test.
34 See the classification in Appendix Ill. The Indiana statute is similar to the "take
possession without payment" statutes, defining shoplifting as taking, stealing or carrying
away merchandise with a felonious intent.
35 Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee and West Virginia.
36 Arkansas, Connecticut, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota
and Tennessee. These statutes create evidentiary rules stating that the ultimate fact (intent to convert to own use) will be inferred from some other fact (concealment of goods)
until evidence to the contrary is produced. See 4 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §1356, p. 724
(1940).
37 In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the Court at 467 states: " . . . a
statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the
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in the apprehension and prosecution of shoplifters by allowing
the merchant to approach the shoplifter before he leaves the
premises.
Potentially, the most effective criminal provision is the "willful
concealment" type of legislation. Although the West Virginia law
quoted above requires the showing of an intent to convert as part
of its willful concealment provision, several other statutes merely
provide that the willful concealment of goods without authority
while on the premises is sufficient to constitute the crime. 38 In
those states with no statutory intent requirement, prosecution is
facilitated by the fact that an offender can be accosted on the premises, and also by the use of statutory presumptions which provide
that goods found concealed upon the person constitute prima fade
evidence of willful concealment.39
Only two states expressly provide that the crime of shoplifting
shall be limited to the theft of goods under a certain dollar value.
In one case the stated value is $50,40 in the other $75.41 The states
which have criminal legislation and do not so provide may face a
somewhat peculiar difficulty arising from the fact that the more
specific shoplifting provision may be held to bar any prosecution
under the general larceny statutes. It would be possible for a court
to use this argument to hold that a person who "shoplifted" an
article of great value could not be prosecuted for grand larceny, a
felony, but must be prosecuted for shoplifting, a misdemeanor:12
Such a holding, however, would clearly not be in line with the
policy underlying the enactment of the new criminal provision:13
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from the proof of
the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience."
Shoplifting legislation of the type under discussion should have no difficulty under this test.
38 Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Virginia.
39 Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire and North Carolina use such presumptions.
40Texas.
41 Washington.
42 See, e.g., State v. Richman, 347 Mo. 595, 148 S.W. (2d) 796 (1941), holding that
enactment of a statute making the drawing of a check with insufficient funds to cover it a
misdemeanor operated to withdraw that conduct from the operation of a statute making
obtaining money under false pretenses a felony. Accord: State v. Beck.er, 39 Wash. (2d)
94, 234 P. (2d) 897 (1951); People v. Breyer, 139 Cal. App. 547, 34 P. (2d) 1065 (1934).
Cf. Price v. United States, (5th Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 120. See, generally, 2 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, 3d ed., §5204 (1943).
43 Georgia and West Virginia have avoided this difficulty by providing that if the
value of the stolen goods exceeds $50 the crime shall be punished as a felony. Kansas provides that the crime shall be punished as a felony if the value of the goods exceeds $50 or
was the subject of grand larceny.
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Statutory penalties for the new crime of shoplifting correspond
to those for petit larceny in many states.44 A few states have provided varying penalties according to the value of the goods taken.'1 5
Some states have place~ heavier sanctions on subsequent offenses,4 6
and most of these make a third offense punishable by imprisonment
in a state penitentiary for a year or more.47 The Oregon statute,
which allows a maximum punishment of seven years for any offense, is unusual in its severity and will probably not be utilized
by the Oregon courts to the extent permissible.'
While the new criminal provisions may be of some value in
gaining convictions,48 they could not be really effective unless
some steps were taken to make it less difficult to apprehend &uspected shoplifters. A ware of this, legislatures have made the new
criminal provisions one part of the overall attack. As the other
parts of the new approach, the states have generally done either or
both of the following to facilitate the apprehension of offenders:
broadened arrest powers of individuals and police officers, and
created statutory privileges in order to lessen the potential civil
liability of merchants who mistakenly detain or accost innocent
persons.

B. Broadening of Arrest Powers
Several states, as part of the current wave of legislation, have
broadened the arrest powers of police officers by permitting them
to make arrests without warrants where there is reasonable ground
or probable cause to believe that the crime of shoplifting has been
44 The Maine statute, which provides for a fine of not more than $100, or imprisonment
for not more than six months, or both, is fairly typical of the statutes which do not provide
progressive penalties for subsequent offenses.
45 See the discussion of the Georgia, Kansas and West Virginia statutes in note 43 supra.
46 Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and Texas. Cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 38, §393, which
creates progressive penalties for subsequent offenses of larceny.
47 Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee
and Texas provide that a third offense shall be punishable by one to five years imprisonment. New Mexico makes a third offense punishable by imprisonment for three to five
years. Indiana is the most severe, providing for disenfranchisement and imprisonment for
two to ten years.
48 The Pennsylvania statute contains a unique provision calling for conviction for the
crime of shoplifting in a "summary proceeding." This aspect of the Pennsylvania statute
is severely criticized on the ground that it violates constitutional jury trial guarantees in
comment, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 445 (1959).
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committed49 or attempted,150 even though not in the officer's presence. Three statutes require that a charge of shoplifting be placed
against a suspect before the officer may arrest,51 while three other
statutes combine this approach with the more generally used reasonable ground test by providing that such a charge by a merchant
constitutes a reasonable ground upon which the officer can arrest.52
Unless some such specific standard of reasonable grounds is stated in
the statute, the judiciary will have to establish a reasonable grounds
formula. This will probably be in the form of the test now generally used in felony cases where officers arrest without warrants,
namely, whether a reasonable and prudent man, possessed with
the knowledge possessed by the officer, could reasonably believe that
the party to be apprehended has committed or attempted to commit
the particular crime.53 It will also be the courts' task to determine
what other limitations are to be placed on the new statutory
powers. For example, it seems likely that the courts will place the
same general reasonable force and time limitations on the new
statutory arrest powers as are placed on similar common law
powers.54
West Virginia is the only jurisdiction which has broadened
the arrest powers of the private individual as a part of its antishoplifting legislation. This was done by making shoplifting a
breach of the peace, thereby allowing the merchant to arrest if the
crime is committed in his presence. However, the fact that most
jurisdictions have not broadened the arrest powers of the private
individual along with those of police officers does not mean the
49 Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee
and Utah require a reasonable belief that the crime has been committed. See also the
West Virginia statute, which makes shoplifting a breach of the peace.
50 Arizona, Minnesota and Washington give the officer broadened arrest powers where
he reasonably believes the person has committed or attempted to commit the crime of
shoplifting.
51 Arizona, Minnesota and Washington.
52 Louisiana, New Mexico and Utah. Under the Utah statute such a charge may not
be made by a minor.
53 People v. La Bostrie, 14 m. (2d) 617, 153 N.E. (2d) 570 (1958). See also Christ v.
McDonald, 152 Ore. 494, 52 P. (2d) 655 (1935). In an action for false arrest the defendant
must justify the arrest. Harrer v. Montgomery Ward&: Co., 124 Mont. 295, 221 P. (2d)
428 (1950). Where the facts are not in dispute the question of probable cause is for the
court. Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182 (1916). Cf. Gibson v. J. C.
Penney Co., 165 Cal. App. (2d) 640, 331 P. (2d) 1057 (1958).
54 See, generally, Wilgus, "Arrest Without a Warrant," 22 MICH. L. REv. 798 at 814-815
(1924). Two statutes expressly provide such limitations. Under the Ohio statute the officer
can exercise his newly-created power only within a reasonable time after the unlawful
taking has been committed. The New Mexico statute allows the officer to arrest off the
merchant's premises only in the event he is in pursuit.
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new arrest provisions are of no direct benefit to the merchants.
Where an officer makes an unlawful arrest at the instigation of a
merchant, the merchant can be held liable as an instigator of or
participant in the unlawful action.65 One defense to such an action
is that the acts involved were not a sufficient participation in the
unlawful arrest to form a basis for liability. Thus, for example, a
merchant cannot be held liable if he merely gives information to
the arresting officer, accompanies the officer during the investigation, or identifies a suspect.66 But a surer defense is to show that
the arrest was lawful in itself. The new statutes, by broadening the
arrest powers of officers, will therefore directly benefit the merchants by narrowing their possible liability for participation m
unlawful arrests.

C. Privileged Conduct and Statutory Defenses Under the
New Legislation
The third and most important prong in the current multipronged attack on shoplifting is the enactment of statutory privileges and defenses which will henceforth be available to merchants in civil actions arising out of their efforts to detain suspected
shoplifters.67 The statutory broadening of arrest powers, to the
extent that it operates as a defense in damage actions, is this type of
legislation. Beyond this, the failure of the common law privileges
with regard to the defense and recapture of property sufficiently to
protect the merchants58 has brought on further legislative change.
This change has taken the form of statutory privileges which may
be exercised without fear of civil liability.
55 See, e.g., Alsup v. Skaggs Drug Center, 203 Okla. 525, 223 P. (2d) 530 (1949), holding
a store liable for instigation of an unlawful arrest. See, generally, 21 A.L.R. (2d) 643 (1952);
PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 51 (1955).
56 See, e.g., Edgar v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 166 Neb. 452, 89 N.W. (2d) 238 (1958);
Check.eye v. John Bettendork Market, (St. Louis Mo. Ct. App. 1953) 257 S.W. (2d) 202;
Simpson v. Burton, 328 Mich. 557, 44 N.W. (2d) 178 (1950).
57 Most of the statutes also provide that a person exercising a statutory privilege will
not be held criminally liable therefor. E.g., the Alabama statute provides that the merchant
exercising the privilege "shall not be criminally or civilly liable for false arrest or false
imprisonment.•••"
58 This failure may be partially traced to the fact that if a court is able to find that
the merchant has in fact arrested the plaintiff, it can hold the plaintiff for making an
unlawful arrest without regard to doctrines of defense and recapture of property. See
comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 887 at 894-899 (1952), for a discussion of this problem. Some
courts have also been quick to find the detention on which a false arrest claim can be
based. See, e.g., Ashland Dry Goods v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 195 S.W. (2d) 312 (1946), holding that retention of a customer's purse along with a statement that she could not leave
until.a package was wrapped was sufficient evidence from which to find a detention. See
also Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943). For a contrary
approach, see Swetnam v. F. W. Woolworth &: Co., 83 Ariz. 189, 318 P. (2d) 364 (1957).
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These provisions raise a host of questions. First, what type of
conduct is covered by the statutory language? Second, under what
circumstances may the privileges be exercised? Third, what types
of limitations, statutory or otherwise, will be used to qualify the
privileges? Fourth, what persons are entitled to exercise the
privileges? Finally, what is the effect of a judicial determination
that the conduct of the merchant is the kind of conduct deemed
privileged by the statute? These questions should be considered
in two different ways: first, with regard to the characteristics common to all or most of the statutes, and second, with a view to the
variations among them.
Nineteen of the twenty-eight states which have legislatively
granted new privileges to storekeepers have done so by allowing
the detention of suspected thieves under certain circumstances.159
Because this "right to detain" type of legislation is by far the most
common, the discussion to follow will be with regard to statutes of
this type, although much that is said may be equally applicable to
all the new legislation purporting to lessen the potential civil
liability of merchants. Legislation granting privileges to merchants in terms other than a "right to detain" will be specifically
discussed at a later point.

(1) Statutes Giving Merchants a Right To Detain Suspects.
Five states legislatively recognizing a right to detain have done so
in identical or nearly identical language, which reads as foll,ows:
(1) "A peace officer, or a merchant, or a merchant's employee
who has probable cause for believing that goods held for
sale by the merchant have been unlawfully taken by a
person and that he can recover them by taking the person
into custody, may, for the purpose of attempting to effect
such recovery, take the person into custody and detain
him in a reasonable manner for a reasonable length of
time. Such taking into custody and detention by a police
officer, merchant, or merchant's employee shall not render such police officer, merchant or merchant's employee
criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention."
(3) "A merchant or merchant's employee who causes such
arrest as provided for in subsection (1) of a person for
larceny of goods held for sale shall not be criminally or r
civilly liable for false arrest or false imprisonment where
the merchant or merchant's employee has probable cause '
159 A

state-by-state classification may be found in Appendix m.
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for believing that the person arrested committed larceny
of goods held for sale." 60
Other statutes of this type are variations of this.
Because of the dangers to personal freedom inherent in any
legislation validating certain types of ·detention, a requirement
that such detention be only for a particular purpose is necessary in
order to sanction the invasion of individual liberties only where
the problem to be remedied so demands. 61 A number of states
have adopted a purpose requirement similar to that in the Alabama statute, quoted above: a merchant may detain in order to
"attempt to effect a recovery." 62 A slight variation of this, which
may permit the use of somewhat more physical force, is "to effect
a recovery." 63 Since goods could be recovered by turning the
suspect over to an officer as well as by direct recapture by the
merchant, the privilege to some extent also encompasses detention
in order to deliver to police authorities. But suppose that upon
being accosted the suspected thief surrenders the goods and tries
to run. May the merchant, knowing the suspect no longer has the
goods, detain him for the purpose of delivering him to the police?
A strict application of the statutory language would result in the
denial of the privilege in such a case, and the merchant would
have to rely upon the privileges accorded him by the common law.
However, it seems unlikely that these statutes will be so interpreted, since most states, like Alabama, provide in a subsequent section that anyone who causes an arrest as provided for in the prior
section shall not be civilly liable therefor. While this might refer
only to the party who takes a person into custody to recover the
goods and incidentally causes his arrest, it can also be taken to
mean that the privilege encompasses detention for the purpose of
delivering to the proper authorities.64
60 Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tit. 14, §334. States with substantially identical provisions are Florida, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Tennessee.
61 Three statutes permitting detention contain no express purpose requirement. The
Georgia statute, which allows a person to detain or arrest any person reasonably suspected
of shoplifting, is the most difficult to deal with. The Oregon statute, which allows a
merchant to detain and interrogate is likely to be interpreted as meaning detention for
purposes of interrogation. The South Dakota statute, which allows detention until
promptly notified police arrive, may be interpreted to mean detention for the purpose of
calling in the police.
62 In addition to the states mentioned in note 60 supra, this provision may be found
in the statutes of Kentucky, New Mexico and Utah.
63 Adopted in Arkansas and Pennsylvania.
64 See also the Oklahoma statute, which permits a merchant to detain for the purpose
of attempting a recovery, and at a later point expressly provides that the suspect may be
detained until an officer can be summoned, thereby making it clear that in Oklahoma
detention for purposes of recovery encompasses detention in order to summon the police.
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A few statutes allow detention only for the purpose of causing
an arrest, or of delivering to a peace officer and placing a charge
against the offender. 65 If any recovery is to be effected, it apparently must be through the intervention of the police. Similarly, it may be that the merchant will be given no privilege to
interrogate unless an officer is present. In some states this type of
privilege is indirectly broadened by provisions which allow police
greater latitude in arresting without a warrant. However, privileges of this type, which are clearly prosecution-oriented, 66 have
an inherent weakness, since in many instances where a juvenile or
amateur offender is involved the merchant may have no desire to
prosecute. If he does not, he must choose between risking liability
with only the common law privileges available in his defense, or
allowing the goods to be taken. While putting the merchant to
this choice can clearly be justified on the ground that prosecution
is the desired end and a merchant who thinks otherwise should
not be accorded a privilege, this argument seems unrealistic.67
The rule most in accord with the realities of the situation is that
which allows detention of a suspect either to try to recover the
goods or to deliver the suspect to the police. One state has adopted
such a provision.68
Other jurisdictions have adopted less precise purpose requirements. These include detaining "to question," "to investigate,"
and "to investigate ownership of the goods." 69 None of these
seems to go so far as to justify the use of force to recover the goods,
so that a merchant effecting such a recovery would have to depend
on common law recapture doctrines. On the other hand, detention for purposes of investigation is somewhat broader than detention in order to deliver to the police, since it is not primarily
prosecution-oriented, while at the same time it should be interpreted to permit detention for the purpose of calling in the police
to aid with the investigation.
65 Minnesota (in order to deliver to officer and make charge), New Mexico (in order
to deliver to officer) and Ohio (in order to cause arrest). Virginia permits a merchant to
cause an arrest without speaking in terms of detention.
66 This is particularly true of the Minnesota and South Dakota statutes. Minnesota
states that detention must be for the purpose of delivering to law authorities and placing
a charge against the suspect; South Dakota provides that a merchant who is requested to
sign a complaint and testify and fails to do so may not assert the statutory privilege.
67 Ohio has recognized this difficulty by providing that where juveniles are involved
the detention may be not only for the purpose of causing an arrest, but also in order to
recover the stolen items or communicate with the parents of the offender.
68 New Mexico.
69 Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana and Massachusetts. The Oregon statute may be interpreted to mean detention for the purpose of interrogation. See note 61 supra. The
Mississippi statute allows a merchant to question, without mention of detention.
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Once it has been decided that a merchant may detain for a
particular purpose, legislatures must set forth the circumstances
in which the merchant may exercise his privilege. Most of the
statutes70 provide that the suspect may be detained only when the
merchant has "probable cause" or "reasonable grounds" for holding a particular belief: the variation in statutory language occurs
with regard to the type of belief which must be held. The most
frequently used test is again found in the Alabama statute: the
detaining actor must have "probable cause for believing that goods
held for sale by the merchant have been unlawfully taken by a
person and that he can recover them by taking the person into
custody."71 The last part of this test is a natural complement to
provisions allowing detention for the purpose of recovering goods.
States allowing detention for other purposes have generally
adopted the same test, absent the language concerning recovery
of the goods.72 While the Alabama statute suggests that two independent "belief" tests must be met, this will probably not be
the case. The courts should realize that while the statute does
invite judicial consideration of such circumstances as physical size
and the number of parties involved in order to determine whether
there were reasonable grounds for believing that the goods could
be recovered, it is always reasonable for a merchant to believe that
the fact of detention will in itself result in recovery of the goods.
With this realization, the second test embodied in the Alabama
statute becomes relatively meaningless.
A few states require. that the actor have reasonable grounds for
believing that the newly-defined crime of shoplifting has been
committed.73 Where this is combined with a provision that willful concealment either constitutes or is prima facie evidence of
the new crime,74 a shopkeeper should be allowed to detain whenever he sees willful concealment or has reasonable grounds to be70 Only the Arkansas and Pennsylvania statutes contain no such express requirement,
both simply providing that shoplifters "may be detained." It is likely, however, that the
requirement will be implied. See Cohen v. Lit Bros., 166 Pa. Super. 206, 70 A. (2d) 419
(1950).
71Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tit. 14, §334(1). Substantially the same provision
has been enacted in Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Tennessee.
72 Illinois and Minnesota require a reasonable belief that the suspect has wrongfully
taken or is wrongfully taking. New Mexico, Ohio and Utah require a reasonable belief
that the suspect has wrongfully taken.
73 Georgia, Kansas and Oregon. Louisiana's statute is analogous, requiring a belief
that theft has been committed. Similarly, the Massachusetts statute requires reasonable
grounds for believing that the detained person was committing or attempting to commit
larceny of goods held for sale.
74 Both Georgia and Oregon provide that the fact of willful concealment shall
constitute the crime of shoplifting.
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lieve such concealment has taken place. However, the advisability
of making the privilege exercisable only on a belief that the
elements of a statutory crime are present may not be wise, since
the technical elements of the crime may not be generally known.
An objective standard will be used to determine whether or
not the merchant had reasonable grounds or probable cause for
his belief,75 this being a question of law for the court to decide76
with the jury being used to determine disputes in the facts on
which the resolution of that question depends. 77
With the exception of Louisiana and Minnesota, all the
statutes giving a merchant some privilege to detain add the
proviso that the detention must be "in a reasonable manner and
for a reasonable length of time." The reasonable manner limitation encompasses a number of elements. First, whether or not a
given manner of detention is reasonable may turn on whether it is
a manner well adapted to carry out the privilege.78 For example,
a detention which is made unnecessarily public may be unreasonable. Similarly, detention and interrogation carried on in an insulting and humiliating way may be unreasonable when it could
have been done equally well in a courteous manner.79 Second, application of the reasonable manner requirement should include
an examination of the place of detention. Third, the requirement
incorporates a test of reasonable force. 80 Several factors may be of
75 Cf. Brodie v. Huck, 187 Va. 485, 47 S.E. (2d) 310 (1948), a malicious prosecution
case stating that in order to find probable cause the prosecutor must believe in the guilt
of the accused and that that belief must be reasonable. In the case of the new shoplifting
statutes, an honest and strong belief that the prohibited act has occurred should suffice
as long as the existing circumstances would lead a reasonable and prudent man to the
same conclusion. This test is expressly set out in the Georgia statute.
70 Roberson v. J. C. Penney Co., 136 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 288 P. (2d) 275 (1955); Collyer
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936). Cf. Crim v. Crim, 39 Ala. App.
413, 101 S. (2d) 845 (1958), suggesting that probable cause as a justification in a malicious
prosecution case is a question of law because of the danger that the jury, when faced with
the fact of the individual's defamation, may overlook the justifiable and commendable
acts of citizens who have grounds for believing that a serious breach of social conduct has
occurred. See note, 3 U.C.L.A. L. R.Ev. 269 (1956).
77 Roberson v. J. C. Penney Co., 136 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 288 P. (2d) 275 (1955), note, 3
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 269 (1956); Cohen v. Lit Bros., 166 Pa. Super. 206, 70 A. (2d) 419 (1950).
Cf. Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E. (2d) 384 (1957) (malicious prosecution case),
78 See Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936), holding that
a detention for purposes of investigation was reasonable although the compulsion used was
threat of arrest and the plaintiff was asked to restore the property, since the court felt
this was the only way defendant could protect his property. See also Teel v. May Department Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696 at 706-707, 155 S.W. (2d) 74 (1941).
79 See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., p. 105 (1955).
so Both the Minnesota and Louisiana statutes, which contain no reasonable manner
limitations, contain express provisions for the use of no more than reasonable force. The
Minnesota statute further requires that the suspect be promptly informed of the purpose
of the detention and that he not be questioned against his will.
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importance with regard to the use of force. It may be that the
courts will adopt some established test by analogy to common law
privilege doctrines.81 For example, it may be that force will be
held reasonable up to the point where a breach of the peace
occurs or serious bodily harm is inflicted.82 On the other hand,
it may be that the question will simply turn on the facts of each
case. Another factor will be the extent to which the privilege itself
envisions the use of force. The right to detain in order to effect
a recovery may implicitly permit the use of more force than the
right to detain to "attempt" to effect a recovery. The right to
detain to investigate may not implicitly permit as much force as
that where recovery is the purpose. Finally, the reasonable manner limitation must to some extent depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case: the age and sex of the suspect, the value
of the goods thought stolen, etc. The question of reasonable manner, as well as reasonable time, is for the jury.83
What constitutes a reasonable length of time will depend on
the particular facts and the privilege involved. If the statute
allows detention in order to deliver to a peace officer, reasonable
time must be at least the time required to get an officer on the
scene. Common law authority on this question will undoubtedly
be used as precedent.84 Two states expressly provide that detention shall not exceed one hour, although a reasonable time may be
less than one hour. 85
Some statutes provide express limitations on the exercise of the
privilege other than reasonable manner and time. Three states
provide that the detention must take place on or in the immediate
vicinity of the merchant's premises, a requirement which may be
read into the reasonable manner limitation anyway.86 Louisiana
81 See comment, 24 TENN.
82 E.g., the degree of force

L. REv. 1177 at 1182 (1957).
deemed reasonable in order to recapture personal property
is force reasonably necessary and not intended to cause death or serious bodily harm. 1
TORTS REsrATEMENT §106 (1934). This same test is embodied in the Wisconsin statute,
discussed at note 103 infra.
83 See, e.g., Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943)
(reasonableness of investigation is for the jury); Curlee v. Scales, 200 N.C. 612, 158 S.E. 89
(1931) (where privilege to protect property was asserted in assault and battery case, the
question of excessive force was for the jury).
84 See, e.g., Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936) (twentyminute detention reasonable); Bettolo v. Safeway Stores, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 430, 54 P. (2d)
24 (1936) (detention of slightly less than fifteen minutes reasonable). See also TORTS REsrATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. 1, §120A, comment f (1957) ("Fifteen minutes
may be too long where all that is necessary is to ask a clerk whether the other has paid.").
85 Louisiana and New Mexico.
86 Kansas, Massachusetts and Ohio. The American Law Institute has refused to express any opinion as to whether "reasonable manner" as used in the merchant protection
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requires that the detention must be on the premises. Ohio provides that the privilege cannot be exercised until the suspect has
left the premises. This latter limitation seems too severe, for it
eliminates one of the basic values of the detention type statute, the
ability of the merchant to act before the suspect leaves the store.87
The statutes vary somewhat with regard to who can exercise
the privilege to detain. In general, however, three observations
can be made. First, the statutes are rather broad in this respect
because the merchant must not only be protected from liability
for his own conduct but from vicarious liability arising out of the
conduct of his employees.88 Second, legislatures have sought to
avoid judicial limitations based on the nature of employment by
leaving out all references to specific types of employees. Third,
the privilege is usually given to a broad class of persons, in accord
with a policy of granting the privilege to persons most likely to
witness circumstances creating a suspicion of shoplifting. The
most common formulation is that the privilege extends to "any
peace officer, merchant or merchant's employee."89 Some states
do not extend the privilege of detention to peace officers, often
adding merchant's "agents" to the list.90 The use of the term
doctrine includes detention in the immediate vicinity of the merchant's premises as well
as detention on the premises. TORTS REsTATEMENT SECOND, Tentative Draft No. I, §120A,
caveat (1957).
87 Ohio has made this limitation less severe where the store is of a self-service type. In
such a case, the suspect may be detained after he passes the check-out counter. The requirement is clearly meant to assure that the person detained intends to convert the goods.
In this connection it should be noted that Ohio has not enacted a new criminal provision
covering shoplifting.
88 See, e.g., Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50 S.E. (2d) 387 (1948);
comment, 47 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 82 at 92-98 (1952). Cf. Szymanski v. Great Atlantic &:
Pacific Tea Co., 79 Ohio App. 407, 74 N.E. (2d) 205 (1947) (store liable for conduct of
employees of independent contractor hired as. store detectives); Combs v. Kobacker Stores,
(Ohio App. 1953) 114 N.E. (2d) 447 (store liable for conduct of a fellow partner). The
merchant defendant may escape liability by showing that his agent or employee acted
outside the scope of his authority. E.g., Rigby v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 160 Wis. 228, 151
N.W. 260 (1915); Rogers v. Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 48 Wash. (2d) 879, 297 P. (2d) 250
(1956). See, generally, 35 A.L.R. 645 (1925) and 77 A.L.R. 927 (1932).
so Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. The Utah statute is similar, adding the term
"agent." The Arizona statute, discussed in text at note 107 infra, extends its privilege to
this same group. The Louisiana statute refers to "specifically authorized employees,"
thereby raising the question whether this is to be interpreted to mean specifically authorized to exercise the privilege at any time, or specifically authorized with regard to the
particular detention.
90 Merchant or employee: Kansas, Minnesota and Ohio. Owner, operator, manager or
employee: New Mexico. Merchant, agent or employee: Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts and
Virginia. The Massachusetts statute provides that detention must be by agents or employees "authorized for such purpose." The Virginia statute is unique in extending the privilege to attendants of parking lots owned or leased by the merchant, or operated under an
agreement with the merchant.
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"agent" creates some uncertainty, for an agent may occupy a position with regard to the merchant which is totally unrelated to his
business: e.g., a personal real estate agent. This being so, the
term as used in this context will probably be interpreted to mean
an agent in some way connected with the particular business, an
interpretation which will in most instances coincide with that of
the term "employee."
The final major problem is the effect to be given a judicial
determination that a person authorized to exercise the statutory
privilege properly has done so. Three distinct approaches are
found in the statutes. Four states simply set forth the privileged
conduct without specifying the extent to which its exercise results
in immunity from civil liability.91 Two others provide that no
civil or criminal liability shall arise out of the exercise of the
privilege.92 And the majority list the types of civil actions in
which the privilege operates as a defense. 93 Each approach has its
weaknesses.
Those statutes which are silent on the extent to which the
privileged conduct operates as a defense in civil suits in a technical
sense at least make the defense a matter of implication. This at
once creates both an uncertainty and a flexibility in the law. A
court could hardly hold that such a statute gave a merchant no
defense in civil suits, for this would have the effect of making the
concept of privileged conduct meaningless. This means the courts
will hold either that the statute provides a defense in some types
of action and not in others, or that the statute provides a defense
in all actions. Because of the dangers inherent in applying a
statutory defense in only certain types of civil actions,94 and because of the likelihood that courts will feel such classification to be
a legislative matter, these statutes will most likely be held to supply
a defense in all civil actions arising out of the detention of suspects.
Thus what is said about statutes expressly providing that no
liability shall result from the exercise of the statutory privileges is
equally applicable to those silent on the matter.
The statutes which provide that no liability shall result from
the exercise of the privilege avoid the difficulty encountered by
those which enumerate the classes of actions in which the statute
91 Kentucky, New Mexico, Ohio and Oklahoma.
92 Illinois and Utah.
93 See notes 95, 96 and 99 infra.
94 See text at notes 97 through 99 infra.
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provides a defense, namely, the likelihood that an ingenious plaintiff will be able to bring his action in a form which is technically
outside the statute but which will produce the same result. For
example, a large number of states allowing detention of suspected
shoplifters provide that no liability for false arrest, false imprisonment or unlawful detention shall be incurred thereby. 95 Several
others limit the defense to actions for false arrest and false imprisonment.96 These statutes are likely to be interpreted as providing no defense in actions for slander or assault and battery. Yet
any publicly-initiated detention is likely to give rise to the elements of a slander action,97 and most detention will contain the
elements of at least a technical assault.98 It appears, therefore,
that these statutes prohibit the effective exercise of the privileges
they create by failing to encompass all the classes of actions available to the wronged suspect.99
The apparent reason for expressly extending the defense only
to certain classes of actions is a fear that the removal of all liability
will leave the wronged individual completely remediless. But
while this fear is to be respected, the extension of the defense to
some actions and not to others is not the best way to meet the
problem. The proper balance between the rights of the wronged
suspect and the merchant is best arrived at by making the statutory
privilege a bar to the recovery of exemplary and punitive damages,
as well as damages for mental anguish, and not to the recovery of
actual out-of-pocket losses.100 Such a rule allows the recovery of
actual losses in all cases, rather than the recovery of overall damages
in some cases and none in others.

(2) Statutes Giving Merchants Privileges in Terms Other
Than a Right To Detain. Up to this point the discussion has
95 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania and Tennessee.
96 Georgia, Louisiana and Massachusetts.
97 See, e.g., Camp v. Maddox, 93 Ga. App. 646, 92 S.E. (2d) 581 (1956); Little Stores

v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W. (2d) 13 (1943).
98 See, e.g., Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, I S. (2d) 510 (1941), where the court
found assault and battery in the defendant's act of seizing a package from the plaintiff's
arms and tearing it open, while making accusations against the plaintiff.
99 Four states which expressly or impliedly give the merchant a right to detain have
sought to avoid this difficulty by making the list of actions in which the defense is available
more comprehensive. Kansas and Oregon make the statutory privilege a defense in actions
for slander and assault, as well as false imprisonment, false arrest and unlawful detention.
Virginia adds malicious prosecution to this list. Mississippi is very careful to miss nothing,
adding the phrase "or othenvise" to a very comprehensive list of types of actions.
100 The Michigan statute takes this approach. See the discussion in the text at note
106 infra.
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directly concerned only statutes which in some manner give the
merchant a privilege of detention. Brief mention should be made
at this point of several other statutes which deal with the civil
liability of merchants.
Montana and Alaska have extended a very limited privilege to
the merchant: he may only request that persons on his premises
place or keep in full view any merchandise removed from its place
of display or elsewhere. Both statutes provide that the proper
exercise of the privilege shall be a defense in any type of civil
action.101 The privilege would apparently not extend to attempts
to detain or recover the goods, and the use of the word "request"
indicates that no use of force is contemplated.
The newly-enacted Texas statute on the other hand is as broad
as the Montana and Alaska statutes are narrow, providing that all
persons with reasonable grounds to believe the crime of shoplifting
has been committed "have a right to prevent the consequences of
shoplifting" by openly seizing any goods so taken and taking them,
along with the offender if he can be taken, without delay to a
magistrate or police officer. The statute is silent on the extent to
which the privilege shall operate as a defense, so it will probably
operate as a defense in any type of civil action.102 The language
of "seizure" seems to encompass a greater degree of force than does
recovery of goods or detention. Similarly, the absence of limitations on the classes of persons who may exercise the privilege makes
the statute broader than most.
Two unique statutes are those of Wisconsin and Michigan.
The Wisconsin statute is phrased in terms of the force which can
be used by a person in order to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his property.
Any reasonable force may be used if the actor reasonably believes
it necessary, provided that force likely to cause death or great
bodily harm shall not be deemed reasonable. Certain classes of
third persons, including merchant's employees or agents, are authorized to exercise the privilege. These provisions may be construed to permit detention for questioning, since such detention
is a logical incident to the prevention or termination of the believed unlawful interference. Perhaps the most peculiar fact about
the Wisconsin statute is that by its terms it provides the merchant
101 Alaska does this by simply providing that the person properly exercising the privilege shall not be "criminally or civilly liable." Montana achieves the same result by giving
a comprehensive list of the classes of actions in which there shall be no liability.
102 See text at note 94 supra.
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with a defense to criminal liability only.103 However, in light of
the policy of the statute, analogous defenses for civil actions will
probably be recognized by the courts of that state. If so, the
privilege is likely to be qualified by limitations similar to those
embodied in common law doctrines of defense and recapture,
doctrines from which the statutory privilege is an obvious outgrowth.104
The Michigan statute takes a far different approach. It simply
provides that in civil actions105 arising out of conduct "involving"
a person suspected of theft of goods held for sale where the merchant had reasonable ground to believe the person involved had
committed a theft, no damages for mental anguish or exemplary
or aggravated damages shall be allowed unless the merchant or his
agents acted unreasonably. The measure is unique because it
operates at the damage level rather than as a defense.106 The
merit of this type of legislation lies in the fact that it reduces the
financial peril for the merchant who accosts a suspected shoplifter
while at the same time it retains some form of redress for the innocent individual who can show actual damages resulting from the
merchant's conduct.
Finally, two states have legislatively adopted variations of the
defense judicially formulated in Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Co.107
This is the so-called merchant protection doctrine, which simply
provides that reasonable cause shall be a defense in false imprisonment actions brought by suspected shoplifters who were temporarily detained for investigation by merchants. Arizona provides that reasonable cause shall be a defense in actions for false
imprisonment, false arrest or wrongful detention against merchants, their employees and peace officers by persons suspected of
shoplifting. Washington has accorded the same defense to its
police officers only. The statutes do extend the doctrine somewhat beyond its common law development, since it had not generally been available in actions for false arrest.108 Also, the
statutes may be interpreted to allow detention for purposes other
103 Wis. Stat. (1957) §939.45.
104 These limitations are fully discussed in comment, 46 Iu.. L. REv. 887 (1952).
105 Specifically, the statute applies to actions of false imprisonment, unlawful arrest,
assault, battery, libel or slander.
106 In this respect the Michigan statute closely resembles the doctrine allowing the
use of probable cause as a device to mitigate damages. See note 26 supra. See also the
Report of the Michigan Legislative Committee on Shoplifting, 69th Mich. Leg. (Reg. Sess.
1958) House Journal, No. 23, p. 249.
1015 Cal. (2d) 175, 54 P. (2d) 20 (1936).
10s See note 28 supra.
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than investigation, unlike the common law rule. But the statutes
still have defects. They are so lacking in precision that they fail
to give merchants any standard which they can effectively use to
evaluate their own actions. And they also fail to provide defenses
in actions for slander and assault and battery, areas where protection is needed.
CONCLUSION

While the statutes under discussion have not been on the
books for a long enough period of time for any trends in interpretation or determinations of effectiveness to be formulated,
several conclusions can be drawn. First, it seems unlikely that
any great decrease in the amount of shoplifting_ will take place in
those states which have done no more than enact new criminal
legislation. The apprehension of criminals will remain just as
great a problem as before. Second, according defenses in civil
actions to merchants who seek to apprehend shoplifters should be a
potent weapon against shoplifting for several reasons. These
provisions supply a means for dealing with juvenile offenders
which may be more desirable than criminal prosecution. The
non-professional shoplifter may be deterred by the mere fact of
humiliation arising from apprehension by a merchant. And,
perhaps most important, a merchant may act with some degree of
speed when shoplifting is suspected. Third, the statutory privileges are likely to receive a strict construction from courts which
will regard them as an infringement of individual freedom. There
is undoubtedly a very real threat to that freedom in these statutes,·
for while it is true that theoretically the innocent person will be
released and saved the humiliation of arrest and jailing, the fact
remains that detention may be humiliating in itself. For this reason, it seems best to provide that where the merchant exercises a
statutory privilege, the offended person may still recover his outof-pocket losses, having no right to exemplary or punitive damages
or damages for mental anguish.109 The merchant's risk is substantially reduced, while some slight remedy is preserved for the innocent party who is actually injured.

Wilbur ]. Markstrom, S.Ed.
109 To a small extent, this result is now achieved by the fact that appellate courts
often reduce excessive punitive and exemplary damages in false imprisonment and arrest
cases arising out of shoplifting situations. See Hammargren v. Montgomery Ward 8: Co.,
172 Kan. 484 at 502-504, 241 P. (2d) 1192 (1952). See, generally, 35 A.L.R. (2d)·273 (1954).
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APPENDIX I
RECENT SHOPLIFTING LEGISLATION

State

'Year
Enacted

Statutory Citation

Ala. Code (1940; Supp. 1957) tic. 14, §334
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1958) §§20-1-5
co 20-1-6
Ariz. Rev. Scat. (1956; Supp. 1959) §§13-673 co 13-675
Arizona .......... .
1958
Ark. Scat. Ann. (1947; Supp. 1959) §§41-3939 co
Arkansas .•........
1957
11-3942
Public Ace 596, Laws 1959
Connecticut. . . . . . .
1959
Fla. Scat. Ann. (1914; Supp. 1958) §811.022
Florida. . . . . . . . . . .
1955
Georgia .......... 1957, 1958 Ga. Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1958) §§26-2640 co
26-2642; Ga. Code Ann. (1956; Supp. 1958) §1051005
Idaho Code (1948; Supp. 1959) §18-4626
Idaho ........... .
1957
Ill. Rev. Scat. Ann. (1959) c. 38, §§252.1 co 252.4
Illinois ........•..
1957
Ind. Scat. Ann. (Burns, 1956; Supp. 1959) §§10-3024 co
Indiana .......... .
1959
10-3027
House Bill No. 388 (1959)
Kansas .......... .
1959
Ky. Rev. Scat. (1959) §§433.234 co 433.236
Kentucky ........ .
1958
Louisiana ........ .
La. Rev. Scat. (1950; Supp. 1958) tic. 15, §§84.5 co
1958
84.6
Me. Rev. Scat. (1954; Supp. 1957) c. 132, §10-A
Maine .......... .
1955
Mass. Laws Ann. (1956; Supp. 1958) c. 231, §94-B
Massachusetts ..... .
1958
Mich. Pub. Aces (1958) p. 211, Ace No. 182
Michigan ........ .
1958
Minn. Scac. Ann. (1917; Supp. 1958) §§622-26 co
Minnesota ....... .
1957
622-27
Miss. Code Ann. (1956; Supp. 1958) §§2374.01 co
Mississippi ...... .
1958
2374.06
Montana ........ .
Mone. Rev. Code (1917; Supp. 1959) §§64-212 co
1957
64-213
1957
Neb. Rev. Scat. (1943; re-issue 1956; Supp. 1957)
Nebraska ........ .
§§29-402.01 co 29-402.03
N.H. Rev. Scat. Ann. (1955; Supp. 1957) §582.15
New Hampshire . . .
1957
New Mexico. . . . . . 1957, 1959 N.M. Scat. Ann. (1953; Supp. 1959) §§40-45-24 co
40-45-27
North Carolina ....
1957
N.C. Gen. Scac. (1953; Supp. 1959) §14-n.1
1957
Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §2935.041
Ohio .....••......
Oklahoma ....... .
1957
Okla. Scac. (1958) tic. 22, §§1341-1342
1959
Laws 1959, chapter 626
Oregon •..•.....•.
Pa. Scar. Ann. (Purdon, 1945; Supp. 1958) tic. 18,
Pennsylvania ..•....
1957
§4816.1
Rhode Island ..... .
House Bill No. 1482 (1959)
1959
S.C. Code (1952; Supp. 1959) §§16-359.1 co 16-359.4
South Carolina .•...
1956
House Bill No. 620 (1959)
South Dakota ..... .
1959
Tenn. Code Ann. (1955; Supp. 1959) §§39-4235 co
Tennessee ........ .
1957
39-4236, 40-824 co 40-826
Tex. Penal Code Ann. (Vernon, 1953; Supp. 1959)
Texas .•..........
1959
Arc. 1436e
Ucah Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1959) §§77-13-30 co
Ucah ...••........
1957
77-13-32
Va. Code (1950; Supp. 1958) §§18-187.1 co 18-187.3
Virginia .•.•..•...
1958
Washington ...... .
1959
Laws 1959, chapter 229
W. Va. Code (1955; Supp. 1959) §§5990(8) co 5990(11)
1957
W~ Vi.rginia .... .
WISCollSID .•...•...
1957
Wis. Scat. (1958) §939.49
Alabama ...•......
Alaska ...•....•...

1957
1957
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APPENDIX II

Aaruisr

POWERS OF OFFICERS AND PRIVATE PERSONS WITHOUT A
M1sDl!Ml!ANORS IN A SHOPLIFTING CONTEXT*

Powers Apart from
Shoplifting Laws

wARRANT FOR

Broadened by the
Laws

State

Alabama ..................
Alaska ...••...............
Aiizona ...........•.......
Aikansas ...•..............
California •................
Colorado ..................
Connecticut ...............
Delaware .................
Florida ...................
Georgia ...................
Hawaii ...................
Idaho ....................
Illinois ...................
Indiana ...................
Iowa .•...................
Kansas ...................
Kentucky .................
Louisiana .................
Macyland .................
Maine ....................
Massachusetts ..............
Michigan .................
Minnesota ................
M~issiJ?Pi ...............
M1SSoun ........•.........
Montana ..................
Nebraska ..................
Nevada ...................
New Hampshice ............
New Jersey ................
New Mexico ..............
New York ................
Notth Carolina ............
North Dakota .............
Ohio .....................
Oklahoma ................
Oregon ...................
Pennsylvania ...............
Rhode Island ..............
South Carolina .............
South Dakota ..............
Tennessee .................
Texas ....................
U~ah_. .............. _.......
V1rgm1a ..................
Vermont ..................
W ashin~to~ : ..............
W~ V1_rgm1a .............
W1SCons1n .................
Wyoming ....•.......••...

Private
Persons

Officers

Officers

(1)
(1)
CL
CL
(1)
(1)
CL
CL
CL
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
CL
(1)
CL
·CL
CL
CL
CL
CL
CL
(1)
(1)
CL
(1)
Note 22
(1)
CL
CL
CL
(1)
CL
(1)
CL
(1)
(1)
CL
CL
(1)
(1)
(1)
Note 22
(1)
CL
CL
CL
CL
CL
Note22

(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
Note 24
CL
(3)
(2)
(2)
Note 24
(2)
Note 24
(2)
Note 24
CL
CL
(2)
CL
(2)
(2)
Note 24
(2)
(2)
CL
(2)
(2)
(2)
(3)
CL
CL
(2)
(3)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
Note 24
(2)
(2)
(2)
Note 24
(2)
CL
CL
CL
CL
Note24
(2)

§334(2)

Private
Persons

§13-674

§811.022(2)

§2

§622.27(2)

§2

§40-45-27

§2935.041
§1342

§40-825
§77-13-31
§2
§5990(11)

§5990(11)

• All notes referred to are in the text. The statutory citations are taken from the complete table
in Appendix I.
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SYMBOLS: CL-Common law rules applied.
(!)-statutes generally allowing a private person to arrest without a warrant for any public
offense committed or attempted in his presence.
(2)-statutes generally allowing an officer to arrest without a warrant for any public offense
committed or attempted in his presence.
(3)-statutes generally allowing an officer to arrest without a warrant when he has reason•
able ground to believe the person committed a misdemeanor in his presence.
(I) Statutes broadening arrest powers of private persons: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 15, §158; Alaska
Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §66•5-37; Cal. Penal Code Ann. (Deering, 1949) §837; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(1953; Supp. 1957) §39-2-20; Ga. Code Ann. (1953) §27-211; Hawaii Rev. Laws (1955) §255-3; Idaho
Code (1948) §19-604; IlL Rev. StaL (1959) c. 38, §657; Iowa Code (1958) §755.5; Minn. Stat. (1957)
§629.37; Miss. Code Ann. (1956) §2470; MonL Rev. Code Ann, (1947) §94-6004; Nev. Rev. Stat. (1959)
§171.240; 66 N.Y. Consol, Laws (McKinney, 1958) §183; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §29-0620; Okla. Stat.
(1937) tiL 22, §202; Ore. Rev. StaL §133.310; S.C. Code (1952) §17-251 (larceny); S.D. Code (1939)
§34.1608; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955; Supp. 1959) §40-816; Utah Code Ann. (1953) §77-13-4.
(2) (3) Statutes broadening the arrest powers of police officers: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 15, §154;
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §66-5-30; Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1956) §13-1403; Ark. Stat. (1947) §43-403;
Cal. Penal Code Ann. (Deering, 1949; Supp. 1957) §836; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 11, §1906; Fla.
StaL Ann. (1944; Supp. 1958) §901.15; Ga. Code Ann, (1953) §27-207; Idaho Code (1948) §19-603;
Ind. StaL Ann. (Burns, 1956) §9-1024; La. Rev. Stat. (1950) tit. 15, §60; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c. 147,
§4; Mass. Rev. StaL (1956) c. 276, §28; Minn. Stat. (1957) §629.34; Miss. Code Ann. (1956) §2470;
MonL Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §94-6003; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943; re-issue 1956) §29-401; Nev. Rev. Stat.
(1959) §171,235; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §594.10; 66 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1958; Supp.
1959) §177; N.C. Gen. StaL (1953; Supp. 1959) §15-41; N.D. Rev. Code (1943; Supp. 1957) §29-0615;
Okla. StaL (1937) tiL 22, §196; Ore. Rev. Stat. §133.350; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §37005;
S.C. Code (1952) §§17-251, 17-253; S.D. Code (1939) §34.1609; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955) §40-803; Utah
Code Ann. (1953) §77-13-3; Wyo. Stat. (1957) §7-12.
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TYPES OP PROVISIONS ADOPTED BY THI! STATES IN THEIR SHOPLIFTING LEGISLATION

Privileged Conduct

Criminal Provisions
Stale

Take
Possession
with intent
lo convert

Willful
concealmen/

Alteration
of labels

Changing
amount i11
container

Alabama

Type of conduct privileged
Privi'lege lo detain

X

Arkansas

X(a)

Connecticut

X(a)

Florida
Georgia

X

Idaho

X

X

Request that goods
be kept In view

"no liability"

Implied, See text
at note 108

FA, FI, UD

In order to recover goods

FA,FI, UD

In order to attempt recovery of
goods

FA,FI, UD

See note 61

FA,FI

In order to investigate ownership

"no liability"

X

X

X

In order to question

FA, FI, UD, A, D, S

Kentucky

X(b)

In order to attempt recovery of
goods

Statute silent

In order to question

FA,FI

Louisiana
Maine

....~

s
~

t""

~

r

See note 34

Kansas

X

X(c)

Massachusetts

FA,FI

In order to question

Michigan

Implied. See text
at note 105

Minnesota
Mississippi

X

X(c)

Illinois
Indiana

X

When a defense
FA,FI, UD,

In order to attempt recovery of
goods

Alaska
Arizona

Other

Broadened
Arrest
Powers

X(a)

FA, FI, A, B, L, S

In order to deliver suspect to
officer

FA, FI, UD

In order to question.
See note 69

FA, FI, UD, MP, S
or "otherwise"

r--1

X

~
Cl
00

,_.
Montana

Request that goods
be kept in view

Nebraska

c.o

S, FA or "otherwise"

In order to attempt recovery of
goods

FA,FI, UD

X

In order to attempt recovery or
deliver suspect to officer

Statute sllen t

X

Ohio

In order to cause arrest

Statute silent

X

Oklahoma

In order to attempt recovery of
goods

Statute silent

X

See note 61

FA, FI, UD, A, B, S

In order to recover goods

FA,FI, UD

X(c)

New Hampshire
New Mexico

X
X(c)

North Carolina

Oregon

X

Pennsylvania

X(a)

Rhode Island

X

South Carolina

X(a)

South Dakota

X(a)

See note 61

FA,FI, UD

Tennessee

X(a)

In order to attempt recovery of
goods

FA,FI, UD

Texas

O'>
0

'--'

X
X

C')
0

X

See note 33

Utah
Virginia

X

Washington

X

West Virginia

X(b)

Seizure of goods

X

"no liability"

In order to cause arrest, See
note 65

FA, FI, UD, MP,
S,A,B

X

X

FA,FI, UD

~

z

~

X

X
X

X

Wisconsin

X

Statute silent

In order to Investigate and attempt recovery of goods

Implied. See text
at note 108

a::

Defend from Inter- See note 103
ference with property

(a) Statutes providing that willful concealment of goods creates a prlma facle presumption of Intent to convert, and that a finding of goods upon the person or among the belongings of the suspect is prlma facle evidence of willful concealment.

(b) Statutes providing that willful concealment of goods creates a prlma facle presumption of Intent to convert.

(c) Statutes providing that the finding of goods upon the person or among the belongings of the suspect Is prlma facie evidence of wlllful concealment.
ABBREVIATIONS: FI-false Imprisonment; FA-false arrest; UD-unlawful detention; A-assault; B-battery; 8-slander; D-defamation; MP-malicious prosecution.
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